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CHILD CUSTODY MODIFICATION LAW:
THE NEVER-ENDING BATTLE FOR
PEACE OF MIND
Brianna F. Issurdutt*
INTRODUCTION
Ellis v. Carucci1 represents an evolution in Nevada’s child custody laws
that should continue.2  Before Ellis, Nevada courts modified custody arrange-
ments without explicitly considering the best interests of the child. Ellis
cemented the legislative intent behind Nevada Revised Statute (NRS)
§ 125.4803 to make the child’s best interest the focus of the judge’s decision in
custody cases.4
However, Ellis and NRS §125.480 are not enough to accomplish this
overarching goal.  The Nevada legislature should revise NRS § 125.480 so that
the statute explicitly recognizes the instability and adjustments that children of
divorce must endure.  The statute should also be revised to identify factors that
are not appropriate for consideration under the best interests standard and to
provide for the possible use of a Court Appointed Special Advocate.5
Part I of this Note describes the historical development of Nevada’s child
custody laws, from the early law in child custody to the contemporary law and
the Ellis decision.  Part II explains the principal case, Ellis v. Carucci.  Part III
analyzes the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Ellis v. Carucci.  Part IV
proposes a revision of NRS § 125.480.  Part V analyzes the probable effects of
the revisions suggested in Part IV.  Finally, Part VI concludes the note sug-
gesting that courts must analyze additional issues to properly focus on the
child’s best interest in a custody modification decision.
* J.D. Candidate 2010, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas;
B.S. 2007, Pepperdine University.  The author would like to thank Professor Sara Gordon for
her extensive guidance in writing this Note.  The author would also like to extend a special
thanks to Danny Corrigan and the rest of her family for their continuing love, support, and
inspiration, but especially to her nieces, Caira, Shaira, Caylyn, and Camryn Young, who
made her realize the importance of always doing what is truly in the best interest of children.
1 Ellis v. Carucci, 161 P.3d 239 (Nev. 2007).
2 See id. at 243.
3 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §125.480(1) (West 2008) (The statute states, in relevant part:  “In
determining custody of a minor child in an action brought under this chapter, the sole consid-
eration of the court is the best interest of the child.”).
4 Ellis, 161 P.3d at 242.
5 A Court Appointed Special Advocate, or CASA, is a volunteer who represents the child’s
best interest. See infra notes 95, 134-42 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEVADA’S CHILD CUSTODY LAWS
Recently, child custody law in Nevada has adjusted in an effort to provide
more stability for families affected by divorce and custody battles.  As a result,
judges now consider various factors when a parent attempts to modify a cus-
tody arrangement in which the custodial parent has primary physical custody.
These factors are the primary focus of this evolution in custody law.
A. The History of Child Custody Laws
In America’s early days, the law regarded children as property of their
fathers or assumed that there existed a master-servant relationship between
children and fathers.6  Later, the “tender years” doctrine7 emerged, in which
courts began to favor mothers over fathers when granting custody.8  Finally, the
courts shifted their focus to the welfare of the child and the standard for cus-
tody decisions became the best interests of the child.9
1. The Paternal Rights Doctrine
At the beginning of America’s history, children were regarded as vital to
the colonial labor force and the agrarian culture, resulting in children being
employed as if they were adults.10  The common law reflected the father’s
authority over the children; a father had the right to custody over his legitimate
children, which encompassed a right to association with them and a right to
their services.11  These paternal rights were enforceable against all parties, even
the children’s mother.12
2. The Shift to a Maternal Preference
After America developed its agrarian foundation, American society shifted
its focus to the development of industry.13  Parents now had the opportunity to
focus more attention on each child because they enjoyed more free time.14
Mothers became responsible for making sure that their children were not cor-
rupted by the outside world and took a more prominent role in the lives of their
children.15
6 See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS:  THE HIS-
TORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1994).
7 The “tender years” doctrine was a preference for keeping young children with their
mothers because the courts assumed that a mother could best give the needed love and
affection to the young child. See infra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
8 See MASON, supra note 6, at 63.
9 See infra notes 15-45 and accompanying text (explaining how custody law changed in
Nevada to eventually become the best interests of the child standard).
10 MASON, supra note 6, at 2; SUZANNE RAMOS, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF CHILD CUSTODY
32 (1979).
11 MASON, supra note 6, at 6.
12 Id.
13 RAMOS, supra note 10, at 33.
14 Id.
15 MASON, supra note 6, at 52.
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Noticing this change, the courts began to shift toward using a maternal
preference in custody decisions.  In Prather v. Prather,16 a South Carolina
court granted custody of a five-year-old girl to the mother, defying the paternal
rights doctrine for the first time.17
Other courts followed the Prather court’s lead and the “tender years” doc-
trine soon developed.  During this time, the courts emphasized the importance
of the child staying with his/her mother because the very young needed a
mother’s care.18  The courts granted custody to the mother, unless there was
evidence that she was unfit to care for her child.19
In Nevada, Peavey v. Peavey20 authorized courts to use the “tender years”
doctrine in custody cases.21  In Peavey, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that
the child should be placed with the mother, absent a showing that she is unfit.22
The Court felt children should receive the benefit of a mother’s attention, care,
supervision, and advice and that there was no substitute for a mother’s love and
devotion.23  The Court supported its decision by noting that the Nevada legisla-
ture implied the applicability of the “tender years” doctrine in its custody
statute.24
Five years later, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified the “tender years”
doctrine in Smith v. Smith.25  In Smith, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the
trial court has the discretion to decide whether children fall within the category
of tender years, which the court must decide on a case-by-case basis.26
Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court expressly overruled Peavey’s “tender
years” doctrine in Arnold v. Arnold27 because the Court felt as though the doc-
trine was not up to the standards that the Court demanded.28  To overrule Pea-
vey, the Nevada Supreme Court relied on the Nevada legislature’s expression
of public policy29 that courts should not consider the sex of a parent when
determining custody.30  The Court further noted that the “tender years” doctrine
was “nothing more than an expression of a culturally enforced bias favoring
rigidly and unrealistically defined societal sex roles.”31
16 Prather v. Prather, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des. Eq.) 33 (1809).
17 Id. at 44, cited in MASON, supra note 6, at 60.
18 See RAMOS, supra note 10, at 34.
19 MASON, supra note 6, at 63.
20 Peavey v. Peavey, 460 P.2d 110 (Nev. 1969), overruled by Arnold v. Arnold, 604 P.2d
109 (Nev. 1979).
21 Peavey, 460 P.2d at 111.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Peavey, 529 P.2d 209, 210 (Nev. 1974).
26 Id.
27 Peavey, 604 P.2d 109 (Nev. 1979).
28 Id. at 110.
29 Id.; “In determining custody of a minor child . . . the sole consideration of the court is the
best interest of the child, and no preference may be given to either parent for the sole reason
that the parent is the mother or father of the child.”  Act of May 3, 1979, ch. 269, sec. 2, § 1,
1979 Nev. Stat. 367, 368 (codified as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.410) (current
version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.510).
30 Arnold v. Arnold, 604 P.2d 109, 110 (Nev. 1979).
31 Id.
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B. Nevada’s Murphy Test and Its Progeny
After the Nevada Supreme Court overruled the “tender years” doctrine,
the next standard that was widely used to decide child custody modification
issues in Nevada was the Murphy test.32  In Murphy v. Murphy,33 the Court
was asked to determine whether a positive change in a mother’s mental health
constituted an improvement in the children’s welfare.34  First, the Court
awarded temporary physical custody to the mother and then reversed in favor
of the father one year later.35  Three years after that decision, the mother
regained custody.36  The father appealed the custody modification and the
Court finally held that a positive change in the mother’s health alone was not
evidence that the children’s welfare would be improved if the court modified
custody in favor of the mother.37
Murphy provided that a modification to the custody arrangement was only
appropriate when two factors were satisfied38:  First, the circumstances of the
parents must have been materially altered.39  Second, the child’s welfare must
be substantially enhanced by the change in custody.40  Ultimately, the Court
found that the second prong was not satisfied in this case.41
After Murphy, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified the Murphy test in a
line of cases.42  In Adams v. Adams,43 the Nevada Supreme Court decided that
a mother’s improvement in mental health did not qualify as a change in circum-
stances under the first prong of the Murphy test.44  Furthermore, the Court
noted that it could not find that the child’s welfare would be substantially
enhanced by the change in custody.45
C. The Introduction and Effect of NRS § 125.480
This line of child custody jurisprudence was interrupted after Adams when
the Nevada legislature codified what the primary focus should be in custody
cases:  the best interest of the child.46  After the legislature passed NRS
§ 125.480, the Nevada Supreme Court in Sims v. Sims47 concluded that a court
32 Adams v. Adams, 464 P.2d 458, 460 (Nev. 1970).
33 Murphy v. Murphy, 447 P.2d 664 (Nev. 1968).
34 Id. at 665.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.; see also Ellis v. Carucci, 161 P.3d 239, 240 (Nev. 2007).
41 Murphy, 447 P.2d. at 665.
42 Adams v. Adams, 464 P.2d 458, 459 (Nev. 1970); Sims v. Sims, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (Nev.
1993); Gepford v. Gepford, 13 P.3d 47, 49-50 (Nev. 2000); Martin v. Martin, 90 P.3d 981,
983 (Nev. 2004).
43 Adams, 464 P.2d 458.
44 Id. at 459.
45 Id.
46 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(1) (West 2008).
47 Sims v. Sims, 865 P.2d 328 (Nev. 1993).
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should not punish a parent for ignoring a questionable48 court order by award-
ing primary physical custody to the other parent under the guise that it would
be in the best interest of the child.49
Following Sims, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified the second prong of
the Murphy test in Gepford v. Gepford50:  the child’s welfare must be substan-
tially enhanced by modifying custody in favor of the non-custodial parent.51
The Court held that the non-custodial parent would need to show that the
change in custody would enhance the child’s welfare.52  Under the facts of
Gepford, the non-custodial parent did not accomplish this by citing that one
child was unharmed when left unattended when sick while the custodial parent
was at work.53  The Court decided that more than this isolated incident was
needed to show that the children’s welfare would be substantially enhanced by
a change in custody.54
After Gepford, the Nevada Supreme Court decided, in Martin v. Martin,55
that when a custodial parent sought to prevent contact between the child and
the non-custodial parent, a change in circumstances existed only if the preven-
tion was “substantial or pervasive.”56  The Court further noted that granting a
change in custody solely on the basis of one parent’s remarriage would upset
the goal of providing a stable environment for the children.57
Seven years after Gepford, the Nevada Supreme Court modified the Mur-
phy test in Ellis v. Carucci in an attempt to make the focus of child custody
modification cases the best interest of the child.58
48 The Court noted that an order requiring a ten-year-old child to “be ‘within vision range of
the responsible adult at all times’ and ‘not to be left alone for even 5 [sic] minutes’ seems an
absurd order.” Id. at 330.
It may not be ideal to leave a ten-year-old child with the flu at home alone for a few hours (albeit
with telephone access) but it hardly smacks of a reason to lose custody.  While we assume that
the referee, in making that order, wanted to impress upon the mother the need for proper supervi-
sion, the court should not translate impractical parental advice into impractical court orders.
Id.
49 Id.
50 Gepford v. Gepford, 13 P.3d 47 (Nev. 2000).
51 Id. at 49.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 48-49.
54 Id. at 49.
55 Martin v. Martin, 90 P.3d 981 (Nev. 2004).
56 Id. at 983.
57 Id. at 983-84 (The Court held that “if remarriage alone could signify a change in circum-
stances, then children’s home environments could be destabilized solely on that basis.  Sta-
bility is one of the primary objectives behind the changed circumstances requirement, and
children’s stability should not be disturbed simply because the noncustodial parent has been
remarried.”).
58 Ellis v. Carucci, 161 P.3d 239, 243 (Nev. 2007).
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II. THE PRINCIPAL CASE: ELLIS V. CARUCCI
A. The Conflict
When Melinda Ellis and Roderic Carucci divorced in December 2000, a
paternity and custody agreement was part of the divorce decree.59  The agree-
ment provided for joint legal custody of the couple’s daughter, Geena, with
Ellis having primary physical custody, and Carucci having liberal visitation.60
However, by March 2004, Carucci felt that there had been a change in circum-
stances because Geena’s performance in school was declining and he sought to
modify the custody arrangement.61
B. Procedural History
As a result of Geena’s declining school performance, Carucci filed a
motion to modify primary physical custody.62  The district court scheduled a
hearing after Carucci filed his second emergency motion to modify custody.63
At the hearing, Geena’s elementary school teacher, Bridgett Banta, testified
that Geena was “an exceptionally bright student” who had performed well in
her first two quarters but struggled through her last two quarters.64  According
to Banta, Geena failed to turn in homework assignments, talked in class,
refused to revise her work, and was not applying herself.65  Banta testified that
Carucci “regularly inquired about” Geena’s progress but “Banta had very little
contact with Ellis.”66
The district court denied Carucci’s emergency motion to modify cus-
tody.67  Instead, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing three months later
in July 2004 and the parties stipulated that a Dr. Joann Lippert would conduct a
family evaluation and submit a report to the court.68  Dr. Lippert testified that
Geena was attached to both parents and recommended that the parties share
physical custody because this arrangement would serve Geena’s best inter-
ests.69  Carucci argued that the Court should grant him primary physical cus-
tody because he and his new wife emphasized education and he had shown an
interest in Geena’s education by staying in contact with her teacher.70  Ellis
testified that she and her new husband also helped Geena with her homework
and that she believed Geena was simply having trouble adjusting to the divorce
of her parents.71  Ellis also testified that Geena’s decline in performance was a
result of the stress associated with her parents’ ongoing custody dispute.72  The
59 Id. at 240.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 241.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. 
71 Id.
72 Id.
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district court ruled that a modification from primary physical custody to joint
physical custody was in Geena’s best interest because Geena’s declining per-
formance constituted a change of circumstances to warrant modification.73
Therefore, the court modified the custody arrangement so that each parent
would have Geena for a week at a time.74  The district court felt constrained by
the Murphy test and ruled that, in this case, the child’s best interest was
paramount.75
Ellis appealed the order on the grounds that the court abused its discretion
by granting Carucci’s motion to modify primary physical custody because the
evidence did not demonstrate either a change in circumstances or that the modi-
fication would be in Geena’s best interest.76
C. The Nevada Supreme Court’s Ruling
In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Nevada Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion for two reasons:  (1) a four-month
slide in performance constituted a substantial change in circumstances affecting
Geena’s welfare, and (2) parental involvement in a child’s education is cer-
tainly in the child’s best interest.77  The Court found that these two factors
warranted a modification in the custody arrangement.78  The Court also modi-
fied the Murphy test to comport with the language of NRS § 125.480, such that
the focus of the modification decision is on the best interests of the child.79
The court believed the Murphy test improperly placed too much emphasis on
the parents and not the children.80  Now, when Nevada courts attempt to deter-
mine whether primary physical custody arrangements should be modified, two
factors must be satisfied for modification to be warranted:  “(1) there must have
been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child
and (2) the child’s best interest is best served by the modification.”81
Under Ellis, modification of child custody may serve a child’s best interest
even if the modification does not substantially enhance the child’s welfare.82
The Ellis decision also recognized that when determining whether the modifi-
cation would serve the best interests of the child, courts should use the factors
enumerated in NRS § 125.480(4) along with “any other relevant considera-
tions.”83  However, in Ellis, the court performed an explicit analysis according
to the factors that the legislature provided in NRS § 125.480.  The Court recog-
nized that other jurisdictions modify custody while keeping the stability of the
child’s environment in mind, and the Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 244.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 243.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 242.
82 Id. at 243; see also McMillen v. McMillen, 602 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa. 1992) (custody orders
can be modified without proof of a substantial change in circumstances as long as the modi-
fication is in the best interests of the child).
83 Ellis, 161 P.3d at 243.
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that this is the correct course to follow.84  The Court, however, never stated
how it used NRS § 125.480 in its analysis in Ellis, other than noting that the
statute provides an overarching principal to follow:  the best interests of the
child standard.  The lack of inclusion of NRS § 125.480 is likely because the
statute does not guide the courts effectively; the statute simply states a standard
to be imposed in custody modification proceedings and lists a few factors to
follow, but overall the statute is vague and allows the courts to utilize their
discretion.  This lack of guidance is not in the best interest of the children of
Nevada, and will create an inconsistency in decisions when courts are permitted
to substitute personal biases for what is in the best interests of the child.
III. ANALYSIS OF ELLIS V. CARUCCI
Even though Ellis v. Carucci followed NRS § 125.480 by applying the
best interest of the child standard, there is still much progress to make to ensure
that decisions are made that are truly in the best interests of the child.  The
Nevada Supreme Court was successful in prioritizing the best interest of the
child in Ellis.  By changing the language of the Murphy test to reflect that the
change in circumstances had to affect the child in some substantial way, the
Court reminded the lower courts of the legislature’s intent to keep custodial
modifications centered on the best interest of the child.85
Nonetheless, Ellis did not solve all of the problems associated with cus-
tody modification.  Issues like adjustment, instability, and the concept of
divorce as a process are nowhere addressed in NRS § 125.480.86  Furthermore,
factors that judges should not consider as part of the best interests analysis are
also not delineated in NRS § 125.480.87  This aperture in the statute renders the
statute somewhat vague and opens the door for abuse of discretion, as has hap-
pened in other jurisdictions.88  Therefore, the legislature should intervene via
statutory amendment once again and clarify certain aspects of custody law that
are still uncertain to achieve greater consistency in court decisions.
Before Ellis, courts had the discretion to modify custody arrangements
when the parents incurred a substantial change of circumstances, without any
requirement that the change actually affect the child.  This created the opportu-
nity for an abuse of discretion:  judges were modifying custody in situations in
which the changes in circumstances were not affecting the children.89  For
example, in Sims, the trial court modified the custody arrangement as a way to
punish the mother for disobeying an order that was questionable in the first
place:  a ten-year-old child was not supposed to be left unsupervised for even
five minutes and was to be within vision range of the supervising adult at all
times.90  The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the modification because pun-
84 Id. at 242-43 & n.14 (noting that “custodial stability is still of significant concern when
considering a child’s best interest”).
85 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (2007).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See supra notes 77-83.
89 See C. Gail Vasterling, Child Custody Modification Under the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act:  A Statute to End the Tug-of-War?, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 923, 928 (1989).
90 Sims v. Sims, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (Nev. 1993).
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ishing the mother was the primary basis for the modification and because the
modification was not in the child’s best interest.91  Although the Nevada
Supreme Court recognizes that the legislature intended to focus on the best
interests of the child, the opportunity for lower courts to abuse their discretion
would force the Nevada Supreme Court to continuously review the lower
courts’ rulings in this area.92  Thus, the statute should be clarified so that the
lower court judges have explicit guidelines to determine custody modification.
Now that Ellis has established somewhat more concrete guidelines for
deciding a modification of custody case, it is likely that custody decisions will
be more consistent than they have been in the past.  Judges now know that they
must scrutinize the evidence to make certain that the child actually will be
affected by a change in circumstances.  By adding the word “substantially” to
the first prong of the test, Ellis ensured that modification that served the child’s
best interest but did not substantially enhance the child’s welfare could not be
made.93
However, there are other issues that must be considered before Nevada’s
custody modification proceedings will truly reflect the best interests of the
child.  Issues like adjustment, stability, and the fact that divorce is a process are
factors that should be included in NRS § 125.480.94  There should also be a list
of factors that courts should not include in their analysis of what is in the best
interests of the child, such as religion, lifestyle, parents’ sexual orientation, par-
ents’ gender, parents’ financial situation, and the child’s preference.95  Lastly,
the possibility of expanding Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASAs) into
child custody modification proceedings should be included in NRS
§ 125.480.96
91 Id. at 330-31.
92 Nevada does not have an intermediate appellate court.  Therefore, every decision that is
appealed goes to the Nevada Supreme Court and creates a huge burden.
93 Ellis v. Carucci, 161 P.3d 239, 243 (Nev. 2007).
94 The Nevada Legislature has not considered including these factors in NRS § 125.480 in
the past, as evidenced by the lack of discussion of these factors in the legislative history for
§ NRS 125.480. See generally Assemb. 51, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73rd Sess. (May 9
& 17, 2005); Assemb. 51, Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73rd Sess. (Feb. 10, 22 & 28,
Mar. 4 & 15, 2005); Assemb. 51, Assemb. Comm. on Ways & Means, 73rd Sess. (2005);
Assemb. 395, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Sess. (1995); Assemb. 395, Assemb. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 68th Sess. (1995); S. 609, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Sess. (1991); S.
609, Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Sess. (1991); S. 188, S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
61st Sess. (1981); S. 188, Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 61st Sess. (1981).
95 The Nevada Legislature has never considered the idea of explicitly instructing courts not
to include these factors in their decisions, as evidenced by the lack of discussion of these
factors in the legislative history for NRS § 125.480. See generally Assemb. 51, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 73rd Sess. (May 9 & 17, 2005); Assemb. 51, Assemb. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 73rd Sess. (Feb. 10, 22 & 28, Mar. 4 & 15, 2005); Assemb. 51, Assemb. Comm.
on Ways & Means, 73rd Sess. (2005); Assemb. 395, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Sess.
(1995); Assemb. 395, Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Sess. (1995); S. 609, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 66th Sess. (1991); S. 609, Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Sess.
(1991); S. 188, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 61st Sess. (1981); S. 188, Assemb. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 61st Sess. (1981).
96 The Nevada Legislature has not considered CASAs in the past, as evidenced by the lack
of discussion of this topic in the legislative history for NRS § 125.480. See generally
Assemb. 51, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73rd Sess. (May 9 & 17, 2005); Assemb. 51,
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A. Factors That Should Be Added Under the Best Interests Standard in
NRS § 125.480
There a number of factors that should be included in NRS § 125.480 to
fully encompass the best interests of the child standard.  Such factors are the
issue of adjustment, the issue of stability, and that fact that divorce is a process.
1. The Issue of Adjustment
The higher “substantially” standard in Ellis is a safeguard to serve the best
interests of the child.  However, this safeguard is not sufficient protection from
arbitrary decision-making.  Before Ellis, commentators raised issues regarding
custody that are not addressed by Ellis.  One such issue is that children in
divorced families often experience an adjustment period.97  This period of time
can vary from case to case, but during this time the child is learning to cope
with the divorce and its effects.98  During this transitional period, a child may
act out in various ways.99  Therefore, a child may be acting out because she is
having trouble adjusting and not as a result of changed circumstances.  This is
what Ellis was referring to when she testified that Geena was having trouble
dealing with the stress of her parents’ divorce and that was the reason she was
performing poorly in school.100  The one thing that all of these custody modifi-
cation cases have in common is that the parents are divorced.  Because this fact
is constant in every case, the adjustment issue should be more of a factor in
deciding custody modification.
2. The Issue of Stability
This leads to the second issue:  kids need stability.101  If the adjustment
period is plagued with instability, the child may take longer to adjust to the
divorce, or may never adjust.102  Frequent changes in custody are not in the
child’s best interest because they impede the child’s progress in learning how to
cope with the divorce.
The Nevada Supreme Court recognized this issue of instability in Ellis.103
Custodial stability is important in promoting the emotional and developmental
needs of children and, therefore, judges presiding over custodial modifications
should thoroughly review the child’s needs so as not to disturb the adjustment
process.104
Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73rd Sess. (Feb. 10, 22 & 28, Mar. 4 & 15, 2005);
Assemb. 51, Assem. Comm. on Ways & Means, 73rd Sess. (2005); Assemb. 395, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 68th Sess. (1995); Assemb. 395, Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th
Sess. (1995); S. 609, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Sess. (1991); S. 609, Assemb. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 66th Sess. (1991); S. 188, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 61st Sess. (1981); S.
188, Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 61st Sess. (1981).
97 See generally Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94
YALE L.J. 757, 785-89 (1985).
98 See generally id.
99 Id. at 791.
100 Ellis v. Carucci, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (Nev. 2007).
101 See Wexler, supra note 97, at 789-97.
102 See id.
103 Ellis, 161 P.3d at 242.
104 See id. at 243.
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Because the state continuously acts as parens patriae concerning the
child’s welfare, decisions that the courts make cannot be said to ever really be
final.105  Therefore, more safeguards are needed to ensure that decisions that
courts make are sound and necessary.  Judges should be guided by concrete
principles when deciding whether to modify a custody arrangement.  If the
courts haphazardly modify custody arrangements, the children involved will
only suffer.  Surely, this result is not in the best interests of the child.  The
issues discussed above outweigh the possibility of modification only when
there is no real showing that there was a substantial change in circumstances
affecting the welfare of the child and the child’s best interest is best served by
the modification.  For example, if there is domestic violence present or basic
needs such as food, shelter, and clothing are not being met, there is a basis for
modification that will outweigh the risks of adjustment and instability because
these things have the potential to harm the child more than a disruption in
stability or adjustment.
3. The Issue of Divorce as a Process
Finally, adjustment and stability help to identify the final issue:  divorce is
better understood as an ongoing process, not just a single event.106  If the court
keeps modifying the custody arrangement, this has the propensity to impede the
child’s progress; the child is repeatedly being asked to adjust and endure an
unstable environment, instead of just making the transition once.  Every time
there is a change in custody, the child must reevaluate and adapt to the current
situation without knowing that the situation will be the same in a month.  This
lack of stability eradicates much of the incentive for the child to adjust in the
first place.  The result is a frustrated child who acts out because of all the
changes that are affecting her when these changes were made in order to
counteract the behavior of the child in the first place.107  It is a never-ending
battle because the cause of the child’s behavioral problems is never truly
identified.
Geena’s struggle to adjust to her parents’ divorce may have been one of
the factors that affected Geena’s performance in school, as Ellis alluded to
when she testified in court.108  By granting joint physical custody, the Court
gave Geena a better chance to adjust to the divorce because she was still able to
spend a significant amount of time with both of her parents; she was not being
forced to just adjust to a new life with one parent being in her life the majority
of the time.  The Court may have taken this point into consideration when it
105 4 CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE Ch. 25 § 25.01[2][a] (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed.).  Black’s defines parens patriae as the following:  “The state regarded as a
sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for them-
selves.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
106 Wexler, supra note 97, at 785.
107 It has been widely recognized that divorce negatively affects children. See generally
Catherine D. Bridwell, The Psychology of Divorce—A Guide for Non-Mental Health Profes-
sionals, 10 N.J. PRAC. SERIES, FAM. L. & PRAC. §1A.5 (2008), available at Westlaw 10
NJPRAC § 1A.5; Joan B. Kelly, Developing Beneficial Parenting Plan Models for Children
Following Separation and Divorce, 19 CHILD CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 49, 50
(Nat’l Bus. Inst.) (2006), available at Westlaw 33778 NBI-CLE 48.
108 Ellis, 161 P.3d at 241.
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made its decision to grant joint physical custody, but there is nothing in the
opinion that explicitly states this or anything in NRS § 125.480 that compels it
to be taken into consideration.
Because issues like adjustment, stability, and the fact that divorce is a
process all have the propensity to greatly affect a child involved in a custody
battle, these factors should be included in NRS § 125.480 to provide a com-
plete analysis of the best interests of the child.  However, there are other con-
siderations that the statute should specifically exclude from a court’s
consideration in determining custody.
B. Factors to Be Omitted Under the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
NRS § 125.480
While the Nevada Legislature should consider inserting the aforemen-
tioned factors into NRS § 125.480, there are other factors that have no place in
the analysis of the child’s best interests.  In other jurisdictions, inclusion of
such factors leads to an abuse of discretion on the judge’s part and a decision
that may not be in the best interests of the child.109  To prevent this from hap-
pening in Nevada, the legislature should consider explicitly stating that some
factors should not be considered when determining whether custody modifica-
tion is in the best interests of the child.  Such factors may include religion,
lifestyle, parents’ sexual orientation, parents’ gender, parents’ financial situa-
tion, and the child’s preference.
1. Religion
Some courts have considered the religious beliefs of parents and children
when making custody decisions.  Although the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits discrimination
based on religion,110 judges are generally allowed to bring religion in as a fac-
tor when it interferes with the best interests of the child.111  The general rule is
that there must be some showing of harm to justify modifying custody based on
religion.112
For example, in Bentley v. Bentley,113 a New York appellate court decided
that a father could not instruct his children on being a Jehovah’s Witness or
109 See Gould v. Gould, 342 N.W.2d 426, 429, 432 (Wis. 1984) (lower court modified
custody because mother was living with man to whom she was not married); but see S.E.G.
v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 165-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (despite ruling that both parents
provided loving environments for the children, court affirmed custody modification because
it thought that mother’s homosexuality would entice others to make fun of her children);
Boykin v. Boykin, 370 S.E.2d 884, 886 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (custody is modified based on
mother’s “flagrant promiscuity”).
110 The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause states the following:  “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111 Bentley v. Bentley, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
112 Id. (“The Family Court was well within its broad discretionary power in reaching its
determination that the best interests of these children dictate that they be reared in only one
religion.“).
113 Bentley v. Bentley, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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take them to religious events.114  The father claimed that this decision was a
violation of his first amendment rights.115  The court held that there was evi-
dence that the children were being harmed by their exposure to their father’s
religion; the children felt strained because their parents were attempting to
instruct them in different religions.116  Therefore, the lower court’s ruling
prohibiting the father’s instruction of his children in his religion was affirmed
because there was evidence that the children were being harmed.117
In order to prevent an abuse of discretion and to avoid a violation of con-
stitutional rights, the Nevada legislature should consider revising NRS
§ 125.480 to explicitly state that religion may only be taken into consideration
under the best interests of the child standard if there is some evidence that
religion, or lack thereof, will harm the child.
2. Lifestyle
Although lifestyle may seem to be a simple, straightforward topic that
should be considered when the judge analyzes what is in the best interests of
the child, it is not.  This is an area that can easily be vulnerable to an abuse of
discretion, especially because NRS § 125.480 contains the word “wholesome”
without defining what the term encompasses.118  For the purpose of this note,
“lifestyle” refers to the manner a parent lives his or her life.
For example, in Gould v. Gould,119 a Wisconsin court criticized the lower
court’s decision to modify custody when the lower court found that the father’s
home would be a better place for the child to live because the mother was
living with a man she was not married to at the time.120  The Wisconsin Appel-
late Court ruled that in order to modify custody there must be some harm to the
child, which was not present in this case because the child was flourishing in
the environment that her mother and her mother’s live-in boyfriend
provided.121
In order to prevent the courts from abusing their discretion and ruling that
a certain lifestyle is not in the best interests of the child, the Nevada legislature
should consider revising NRS § 125.480 to explicitly state that there must be a
showing of harm to the child before custody is modified based on lifestyle
choices of the parents, as was suggested in reference to religion.  After revising
the statute as suggested, the Nevada legislature will better serve the best inter-
ests of the child because the harm test makes it clearer for judges to see if
something is truly in the best interests of the child.
114 Id. at 560.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 559-60.
117 Id.
118 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(3)(b) (2007) (suggesting custody should be vested with
the party that can provide the child with “a wholesome and stable environment”).
119 Gould v. Gould, 342 N.W.2d 426 (Wis. 1984).
120 Id. at 432.
121 Id. at 431.
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3. Parents’ Sexual Orientation
Some courts have modified custody solely based on the sexual orientation
of a parent on the basis that sexual orientation is not a protected class.122  These
courts are not taking the child’s best interest into account when they modify
custody without a showing of harm to the child.  Nevada courts should avoid
following this trend because they may not truly be acting in the best interests of
the child.  Furthermore, in Nevada, sexual orientation is likely a protected class
because Nevada already recognizes a person’s right to be protected in the
employment context.123  Therefore, Nevada should extend this protection to
custody decisions as well.
An example of a court acting against the best interests of the child is when
a Missouri Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of a modification
of custody in favor of the father solely because of the mother’s open homosex-
uality.124  Although the court determined that both parents were “loving, caring
parents,” it ultimately decided that because “homosexuality [was] not openly
accepted or widespread [in the town]” and because the court “wish[ed] to pro-
tect the children from peer pressure, teasing, and possible ostracizing they may
encounter as a result of the ‘alternative life style’ their mother has chosen,” the
court modified custody in favor of the children’s father.125  The court never
made any finding of harm to the children in this case but instead based its
decision on the theory that the attitude of the community would harm a child
whose parent was homosexual.126
This court’s decision is especially troubling in light of the best interests of
the child standard.  The court found that both parents were caring and loving
toward their children, yet modified custody because it thought that the mother’s
homosexuality was a choice she made and imposed on her children.127  This is
a classic example of a court substituting its own personal beliefs for what is in
the best interests of the child.  There was no evidence of the children in this
case being harmed by the mother’s homosexuality; the court’s goal of prevent-
ing possible teasing and peer pressure was the reason for modification.128  This
is not enough to decrease the amount of time a child spends with his/her parent.
To prevent undue judicial intervention in Nevada custody cases, the legislature
should revise NRS § 125.480 to include a clause that prohibits modification as
a result of homosexuality, absent a clear showing of harm to the child.
122 See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
123 NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330(1)(a) (2007) (“It is an unlawful employment practice for an
employer:  (a) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any person, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any person with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because of his race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability or
national origin. . . .”).
124 S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 165.
125 Id. at 165-66.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 166.
128 Id.
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4. The “Tender Years” Doctrine and the Sex of the Parent
Under NRS § 125.480, the court should not base custody modification
solely on the fact that the person requesting modification is the mother or father
of the child.129  However, the statute says nothing about allowing the court to
use this factor as a part of determining what is in the best interests of the child.
It may even constitute a violation of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to consider gender as a factor, as it is has been alluded to in
other jurisdictions.130
The language of NRS § 125.480 is vague and invites criticism and attack.
To prevent this, the Nevada legislature should revise NRS § 125.480 to explic-
itly state that the gender of the parents should not be considered when deciding
whether to modify custody.  To do this, the legislature should explicitly state
that the “tender years” doctrine established in Peavey should not be used.131
This would codify that the “tender years” doctrine was overruled and provide
for a brighter line as far as what the courts can use for determining the best
interests of the child.132
5. Parents’ Financial Situation
NRS § 125.480 does not mention the parents’ financial situation as a fac-
tor in the best interest analysis.  Because the statute is silent on this topic, the
courts have broad discretion to use this factor in their analysis.  This may lead
to an abuse of discretion because courts may simply decide that because one
parent is better off financially, placing the child with that parent must be in the
best interests of the child.  This is not necessarily true, however.
The Nevada legislature should consider revising NRS § 125.480 to
include financial conditions of the parents as a factor, but it should be framed in
terms of stability.  If one parent is having difficulty providing for the basic
needs of the child due to lack of finances and the other parent will not have this
difficulty, this would be a factor to consider as a part of the best interests of the
child.  This way, the court is still able to consider this important factor, but the
financial condition factor is framed in a manner that limits judicial discretion
and bias.
129 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(2) (2007) states the following:  “Preference must not be
given to either parent for the sole reason that the parent is the mother or the father of the
child.”
130 Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Miss. 1983) (“The question before the
Court is whether the ‘tender age rule’ in custody awards is violative of the father’s right to
equal protection of the law under Fourteenth [sic] Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.”); Pirila v. Pirila, No. C5-03-255, 2003 WL 22079483, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5,
2003) (Appellant alleged the “tender years” doctrine was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Biel v. Biel, No. 84-0925, 381 N.W.2d 619, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 17,
1985) (noting father’s allegation that the court abused its discretion in applying the “tender
years” doctrine because it was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights).
131 Peavey v. Peavey, 460 P.2d 110, 111 (Nev. 1969), overruled by Arnold v. Arnold, 604
P.2d 109, 110 (Nev. 1979).
132 See Arnold, 604 P.2d at 110 (“For the reasons expressed below, we overrule Peavey.”).
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6. Child’s Preference
While NRS § 125.480 does allow the courts to consider the child’s wishes,
this is a factor that should be heavily scrutinized.133  The courts should pay
close attention to the actual reasons why the child wishes to reside with one
parent over the other parent because some children are not equipped to make a
mature decision about what environment is in their best interests.  For example,
if Geena had stated that she wished to live with her mother because it was Mrs.
Ellis that read her bedtime stories, took her to the park to play, and helped her
with her homework, this would be a valid reason for taking Geena’s preference
into consideration.  Similarly, if Geena had stated that the reason that she did
not want to live with her father was that he left her alone often, this too would
be a valid expression of preference that the court should consider.
In evaluating the child’s wishes, the courts should pay particular attention
to the maturity of the child and his/her capacity to make this decision.  Age
may not be the best source of guidance for determining if the child is of suffi-
cient maturity.  For example, if a child is ten-years-old and has demonstrated a
maturity level beyond his age, his preference should not be discounted solely
because of his age.  Likewise, if a child is fifteen years of age yet demonstrates
a maturity that is below his age, this too should be taken into consideration by
the judge.
One concern that is apparent with allowing the child to voice his/her pref-
erence is that court may feel like an intimidating environment to a child.  Also,
the child may feel pressured to choose one parent over the other or afraid to
choose between the two.  This is why the child’s maturity should control
whether or not the court will consider the child’s preference.  Also, the child
should not be forced to choose between the two parents; the child’s preference
should only be voiced if the child wishes to be heard.  Therefore, the Nevada
legislature should revise NRS § 125.480 to specify that consideration of factors
like (1) the reasons for a child’s choice of parent, (2) the child’s maturity, and
(3) assurance that the child is not pressured should be paramount to allowing
the child to testify as to his/her preference.
If these types of factors are considered in the court’s analysis of whether
custody modification is in the best interests of the child without the above-
mentioned safeguards, the propensity for an abuse of discretion is great.  Courts
may begin to substitute their personal values or biases for what is truly in the
best interests of the child.  If judges are permitted to substitute their personal
beliefs and values in place of the best interests of the child standard as man-
dated by NRS § 125.480, not only will this inevitably lead to decisions that are
not always in the best interest of the child, but the system will be unstable.  In
order to prevent this, the Nevada legislature should consider revising NRS
§ 125.480 to reflect this list of factors that should be omitted from the best
interests of the child analysis.  Through this revision, courts would have more
guidance to make a decision that is in the best interests of the child.
133 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(4)(a) (2007) states that in determining the best interest of
the child, the court shall consider “[t]he wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age
and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his custody.”
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C. The Addition of Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASAs)
One other possible way to ensure that the best interests of the child are
represented would be for the legislature to include a provision in NRS
§ 125.480 that suggests that the child have a Court Appointed Special Advo-
cate (CASA) to represent his/her best interest in court, if possible.
CASAs are trained volunteers who research, facilitate, advocate, and mon-
itor the case that they are assigned to represent.134  “When the judge appoints a
CASA volunteer to a child’s case, the CASA volunteer becomes responsible for
developing a consistent, emotionally supportive relationship with the CASA
child, gathering information from all appropriate sources, and making the most
suitable recommendations to the judge about what is in the child’s best inter-
est.”135  The United States Congress promoted expanding the CASA program
by incorporating the program into the Child Abuse and Neglect Act in 1990.136
As a result, there were forty-nine states with active CASA programs in 2005.137
Although CASA was originally developed to represent the best interests of
the child in abuse and neglect proceedings, the program has been expanded for
general use in family court to represent the child’s interest.138  Nevada should
expand the roles of CASA volunteers to include possible participation in cus-
tody modification proceedings.139  However, the provision should explicitly
state that first judges must satisfy the demand for CASAs in abuse and neglect
proceedings before appointing CASAs in custody modification proceedings.140
Because the court has limited information on the child’s situation, someone
who has been trained and checks-in with the child routinely would be a great
asset because the CASA will have the opportunity to get a better understanding
of the child and his/her best interest.  Also, because CASAs are trained volun-
teers and not paid employees, they have no interest but the best interests of the
child.141  CASAs are not presenting the child’s wishes; they only present what
134 CASA Las Vegas, http://www.casalasvegas.org/become-a-casa/faqs (last visited Apr.
30, 2010).
135 CASA Las Vegas, http://www.casalasvegas.org/about/mission-statement/ (last visited
Apr. 30, 2010).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 13011 (2009) (Congress finds that CASAs can be appointed in child
abuse and neglect hearings).
137 Jean Koh Peters, How Children are Heard in Child Protective Proceedings, in the
United States and Around the World in 2005:  Survey Findings, Initial Observations, and
Areas for Further Study, 6 NEV. L.J. 966, 1002 n.116 (2006) (stating that the only state
lacking a CASA program was North Dakota).
138 CASA of Shawnee County, http://www.casaofshawneecounty.org/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2010) (states that CASA in Kansas is involved in “advocat[ing] for the best interest of chil-
dren and youth involved in the court system,” not only abuse and neglect proceedings); E-
mail from Hon. Frank P. Sullivan, District Court Judge, Family Court Division, Department
O, to Brianna F. Issurdutt (Oct. 2, 2009, 08:31 PST) (on file with author) (states that Nevada
also used the services of CASAs on an informal and limited basis in custody matters in the
past).
139 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.505 (2007) (provides qualifications of special advocate for
appointment as guardian ad litem in Nevada).
140 Sullivan, supra note 138 (states that while CASAs will be helpful in custody modifica-
tion proceedings, the need for CASAs in abuse and neglect proceedings should be satisfied
before the using CASAs in custody modification proceedings).
141 § 432B.500(2) (2007) (providing that “[n]o compensation may be allowed a person serv-
ing as a guardian ad litem pursuant to this section”); § 432B.505(1) (2007) (requiring that a
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they think is in the child’s best interest.142  If a CASA is utilized, the judge will
have even more information available when determining the best interests of
the child, thereby decreasing the possibility of an abuse of discretion or a
wrong decision.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO MODIFY NRS § 125.480
In its current form, NRS § 125.480 allows for an abuse of discretion in
child custody modifications.  Therefore, this Note proposes that the Nevada
legislature revise the statute.  Many topics are not addressed in NRS § 125.480
and the statute should be amended to include a discussion of these topics.
Without such a discussion, the statute remains vague and does not further the
goal of acting in the child’s best interests as well as it could.
The first modification that this Note proposes is a legislative amendment
to address the issue of adjustment because it is not discussed in NRS § 125.480.
To ensure that the courts consider this issue when modifying child custody, the
Nevada legislature should look to other states that have such a provision in
their statutes and emulate their statutes.
For example, Delaware’s child custody statute explicitly states that the
child’s adjustment should be a factor that the court considers as a part of the
child’s best interests.143  Another state with a child custody statute that dis-
cusses adjustment as a factor to be considered under the child’s best interests is
Arizona, whose statute reads identical to Delaware’s with respect to this provi-
sion.144  Connecticut’s child custody statute also has a similar provision.145
Nevada’s statute has no such provision; the legislature should consider
inserting a provision similar to these states’ provisions on adjustment to ensure
that this factor is considered by the courts and that the best interest of the child
is better represented.
A second proposed modification is a legislative amendment addressing the
issue of stability because it is not discussed in NRS § 125.480.  Some states
currently have provisions in their statutes that discuss how the court should
consider stability.  For example, California’s statute states that the child should
be in a stable environment.146  Connecticut also has a statutory provision that
states that the stability of the child’s residence should be a factor considered by
the court.147  Florida’s statute has a provision that explains that the courts
special advocate for appointment of a guardian ad litem “must be a volunteer from the com-
munity who completes an initial 12 hours of specialized training and, annually thereafter,
completes 6 hours of specialized training.”).
142 § 432B.500(3)(g) (2007) (providing that a guardian ad litem shall “[i]nform the court of
the desires of the child, but exercise his independent judgment regarding the best interests of
the child . . . .”).
143 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §722(a)(4) (2006) states that the court should consider “[t]he
child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community.”
144 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A)(4) (2009) (providing for court to consider “[t]he
child’s adjustment to home, school and community”).
145 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(c)(9) (West 2007 & Supp. 2009) (providing for court
to consider “the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community
environments”).
146 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(2) (West 2004).
147 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(c)(11) (2009).
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should focus on the “desirability of maintaining continuity.”148  Although these
provisions provide a good foundation for the legislature to emulate, the Nevada
legislature should be more specific in guiding the courts.  The legislature
should consider adding a provision that explains that stability should be consid-
ered because of how important stability is to the best interests of the child.
The third modification that this Note proposes is amendment to NRS
§ 125.480 that addresses the issue of divorce as a process.  It appears that the
Nevada Supreme Court did in fact consider this as part of its analysis in Ellis,
but the Court never explicitly states that it did so.149  The Nevada legislature
should consider inserting a provision in NRS § 125.480 that states that the
courts should bear in mind that divorce is a process that all the parties must
adjust to at their own rate.  This would effectively remind courts to use caution
when they modify custody on the basis that the child is not performing well.
The fourth modification proposed by this Note is a amendment to NRS
§ 125.480 concerning issues like religion, lifestyle, parents’ sexual orientation,
the sex of the parent, parents’ financial condition, and the child’s preferences
because these issues are especially complicated.  With respect to the religion,
lifestyle, parent’s sexual orientation, and parents’ financial condition, the legis-
lature should amend the statute to state that these factors should only be appli-
cable to a court’s child custody modification decision when the factor will harm
the child.  Otherwise, the courts will be intruding into the private lives of fami-
lies, which is not part of their domain.  Allowing courts to consider such factors
when they harm the child allows the court to uphold the best interests of the
child while also respecting the privacy of the family.
When amending NRS § 125.480 with respect to the child’s preference, the
legislature should outline three factors for the court to analyze:  (1) the child’s
reasons for choosing the parent, (2) the maturity of the child, and (3) any evi-
dence of a parent pressuring the child to testify as to preference.  When courts
use the child’s preference as a factor, they should be especially cautious to
ensure that the child is mature enough to make the decision and that the child is
making the decision for the right reasons.
The statute should do more than state that a parent’s sex should not be the
sole consideration in a custody decision:  the legislature should amend the stat-
ute to explicitly state that the sex of the parent should never be a part of the
court’s consideration.  Some states explicitly state that the parents’ gender
should not be a factor considered in custody modification.  In Delaware, the
legislature drafted the statute such that it outlaws a preference for one parent
based solely on the parent’s gender.150  Nevada has a similar provision in NRS
§ 125.480, but it is still vague.  The Nevada legislature should add a provision
to this section that explicitly states that the “tender years” doctrine no longer
applies to custody modification decisions, thereby eliminating the possibility
that the courts rely on the outdated doctrine.
The fifth and final proposed amendment to the statute that the Nevada
legislature should consider is a provision to NRS § 125.480 that provides for
148 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(d) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010).
149 Supra notes 59-83 (all text in reference to the Ellis decision).
150 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(b) (West 2006).
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the possibility of the court using a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA)
to represent the child’s best interests.  Although CASAs are primarily used in
abuse and neglect cases, some states have expanded their role into other areas
of family law.151  Nevada should follow this trend because the explicit purpose
of a CASA is to represent the best interests of the child, the same goal as NRS
§ 125.480.  An excellent way to ensure that the best interests of the child are
represented would be to utilize a CASA.  Because Nevada is already experienc-
ing a shortage of volunteer CASAs,152 courts should fulfill the need for CASAs
in abuse and neglect proceedings before allowing CASAs in custody modifica-
tion proceedings.  Therefore, the Nevada legislature should consider inserting a
provision in NRS § 125.480 to allow courts to appoint CASAs in child custody
modification cases when the need for CASAs in abuse in neglect proceedings
has been satisfied.
V. THE REALISTIC EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
Although courts will still need to use discretion in deciding whether there
is a need for custody modification, courts need more guidance in making these
decisions.  If the legislature does not provide this guidance, Nevada will con-
tinue to be at risk for abuses of judicial discretion in the area of child custody
modification.  Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court will have to continue to
shoulder the burden of reviewing all of these cases unnecessarily if nothing is
changed.
As a result of implementing the modifications to NRS § 125.480 proposed
in this Note, the goal of preventing abuses of discretion is furthered.  This way,
judges will have clearer guidelines to follow, the legislature will have further
reduced the risk of an abuse of discretion and arbitrary changes of custody, and,
most importantly, the child’s best interest will be served.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court’s ruling in Ellis was a step in the right direction towards
achieving the legislature’s goal of focusing on the best interest of the child.
However, the potential for courts to make decisions that are contrary to the best
interest of the child still exists because of the current language of NRS
§ 125.480.  Under NRS § 125.480, judges currently have the ability to substi-
tute their personal judgment for what is in the best interests of the child because
the statute is drafted vaguely, giving little guidance as to what constitutes the
best interests of the child.
If the legislature revises the statute to be more explicit with respect to
issues discussed in this Note, the possibility that critics will characterize
Nevada’s best interest standard as vague or susceptible to abuse of discretion
will be lessened.  Furthermore, if this statutory revision can be accomplished,
151 CASA of Shawnee County, supra note 138 (states that CASA in Kansas is involved in
“advocat[ing] for the best interest of children and youth involved in the court system[,]” not
only abuse and neglect proceedings); Sullivan, supra note 138 (states that Nevada also used
the services of CASAs on an informal and limited basis in custody matters in the past).
152 Sullivan, supra note 138 (states that there is currently a shortage of CASAs in Nevada).
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the courts in Nevada will have a greater possibility of considering all relevant
issues when deciding whether to allow custody modification and therefore truly
will be acting in the best interest of the child.
